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Introduction 
After a period of rapid expansion in 1983 and 1984, the American economy 
is visibly slowing. Pessimists talk about the coming recession in late 1986 or early 
1987, while the optimists see economic growth during the next several years at 
a rate that at best is only one-half of the 1984 pace. Simultaneously, fears of 
debt crises-farm and urban, domestic and foreign-are increasingly expressed. 
Moreover, concerns about import penetration and the resultant job losses are 
rising even more rapidly than the flows of goods and services from overseas. 
All this creates an uninspiring if not dismal economic outlook in the minds 
of many. 
On reflection, the discouraging talk relies on the oldest and simplest method 
of forecasting: extrapolating the most current experience. As Patrick Henry so 
eloquently said, there was only one lamp by which his feet were guided, the lamp 
of experience. But he was not limiting himself to the last two yards that he had 
walked! In the broader perspective of American economic history, there is little 
support for the simpleminded approach to predicting economic trends. Rates 
of expansion vary greatly, and periods of growth and decline alternate. 
A common pitfall awaits people who apply the experience to which Patrick 
Henry referred to in too limited and too simple a fashion. For example, the 
forecasts in Figures 1A and 1B rely on that fundamentally accurate but often 
misleading postulate of geometry: Two points determine a straight line. Thus, 
merely extending the most recent experience in 1982-a sharp decline from 
1981-would have resulted in expectations of an accelerating recession in 1983 
and 1984 (see Figure 1A). That would have missed entirely the strong recovery 
that occurred during that period. In only slight exaggeration, it may be said that 
this approach was widely followed; it typified the pessimism of those who, in 
1981 and 1982, were writing about the fundamental weakness of the American 
industrial economy and advocating ambitious industrial policy approaches to 
deal with that situation. 
An example of such thinking was provided by Ira Magaziner and Robert Reich 
in 1982. They wrote in Minding America's Business, "The U.S. economy is in 
crisis ... In the absence of new strategic directions, the crisis can only deepen." 
Similarly, extrapolating the sharp growth of 1983 and 1984 in the same 
simpleminded linear fashion would have yielded a misleading "up, up and 
away" forecast for the present (see Figure 1B). In essence, this was the spirit of 
the more optimistic supply-siders who expected unbroken prosperity to result 
from the 1981 tax cuts. 
Dr. Murray Weidenbaum is Mallinckrodt Distinguished University Professor and Director of the 
Center for the Study of American Business at Washington University in St. Louis. Richard Burr 
is a Writer/ Analyst and Richard Cook is a Research Assistant at the Center. The authors are indebted 
to Kenneth Chilton and Arthur Denzau for numerous helpful suggestions. 
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THE HAZARDS OF FORECASTING A LINEAR ECONOMY 
Figure lA 
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There is great danger that the latest two points in economic experience will 
continue not only to determine a straight line for the short run, but to influence 
excessively expectations for the long run. Thus, during this current period of 
short-term economic slowdown, many analysts are decreasing their long-term 
projections-their expectations of the growth of the American economy-for 
the entire decade ahead. 
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Sectors of the American economy most heavily affected by imports are 
responding far more dramatically. Here the often-prevalent voices of doom and 
gloom contend that the recent penetration of U.S. domestic markets by foreign 
producers will not only continue but likely will accelerate. A similar cry echoes 
from other sectors of manufacturing, where observers see only a decisive shift 
to services in the future. 
John Naisbitt's 1982 book, Megatrends, helped to set this mood with 
statements such as, "It's becoming clear that yesterday is over, and as the Third 
World prepares to take over the major industrial tasks, the developed countries 
must move on to the new enterprises." More recently the chief executive of a 
major chemical corporation embellished this negative sentiment when he 
described the competitive environment as "a zero-sum global economy." In his 
view, this means that "if individual companies expect to grow they will increas-
ingly have to do it at someone else's expense." 
US. economic history clearly shows that Americans do not live 
in a linear world. During uhard times,,, steps are often taken 
that provide the basis for future expansion. 
In each of these cases, the implicit forecasting approach used is to extrapolate 
naively the most recent experience. Yet U.S. economic history clearly shows that 
Americans do not live in a linear world. For one thing, important feedback 
effects occur. During periods of extremely rapid growth, marginal resources are 
brought into production, lowering productivity while raising costs. This con-
tributes to inflationary pressures, which lead to changes in economic policy-
notably a move to restraint-that halt the expansion. 
Thus, rapid growth in the first half of the 1950s (with an average annual 
increase in real GNP of 4.7 percent) was followed by a slower pace in the second 
half of the decade (3.2 percent yearly). Similarly, a strong growth pace in the 
1960s-when real GNP increased at the average rate of 4.2 percent a year-
was followed by the slower 3.3 percent rate of the 1970s. 
During "hard times," steps are often taken that provide the basis for future 
expansion. These include those cost-cutting, product and process innovations 
and other productivity-raising moves that help to turn the tide. The United States 
is experiencing such a period right now. There are three key forces that make 
a period of sustained prosperity in the decade of the 1990s more likely: 
(1) A variety of actions that reduce the cost of producing goods and services 
in the United States. 
(2) New awareness of personal responsibility for the quality of what 
Americans produce. 
(3) More rapid growth in investments in research and development, the basic 
fuel for innovation and technical progress. 
Let us examine the growing importance of each of these key forces. 
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Reducing the Cost of Production 
For a variety of sensible reasons-most notably to keep up with foreign 
competition-many American business firms have taken actions during the past 
several years that reduce the domestic cost of production. These actions range 
from simple changes in production methods to a basic restructuring of ~he 
business firm. Since compensation of employees constitutes about two-thirds 
of the cost of producing the nation's output, labor costs are a natural starting 
point for cost cutting. 
Reducing Labor Costs 
The measureable changes that are occurring in the labor market are dramatic. 
For example, the 54 strikes involving 1,000 or more workers in the United States 
during 1985 were the fewest since 1947, when the Labor Department first began 
compiling such statistics. In addition, the 324,000 workers involved in the strikes 
was the lowest number of strikers on record. Figure 2 shows vividly the non-
linear nature of the history of labor-management disputes in the United States 
since the end of World War II. In any event, the American economy is enjoy-
ing a sustained period of domestic labor peace. 
More fundamentally, competitiveness has been enhanced by the substantial 
slowing of the rise in nominal wage costs. In 1980, the average worker in the 
private sector in this country received a 9.0 percent wage increase. By 1984, the 
average annual increase was down to 4.1 percent (see Table 1). 
Perhaps surprising to the proverbial man on the street, the change also turns 
out to be beneficial from the workers' viewpoint. In real terms (after boiling 
out the effects of inflation), the average worker in 1980 suffered a 0.2 percent 
decline in real wage rates. In contrast, 1984 witnessed a real increase of 0.3 
percent-a modest change but in the desired direction. The downward trend 
in nominal wage costs was similar in both manufacturing and non-
manufacturing sectors. 
Moreover, the pace of negotiated wage increases in union agreements has 
slowed visibly. During the past four years, some groups of workers have actually 
experienced wage cuts (see Table 2). For example, in 1980, 71 percent of the 
workers covered in major collective bargaining settlements received an annual 
wage increase of 8 percent or more. By 1985, only 4 percent of the workers were 
in that category-and 26 percent received no increase or actually suffered a 
decrease. Looking ahead, the Conference Board's Labor Outlook Panel is fore-
casting a modest 3.6 percent overall increase in average hourly earnings in 1986. 
Some analysts see a further shift in the relative bargaining power of manage-
ment and labor resulting from greater use of "contingent" employees. For exam-
ple, companies that are trying to respond to rapid market changes, especially 
due to foreign competition, are increasingly using temporary and employee-
leasing arrangements. Contingent employees also serve as a buffer to protect 
the security of regular employees. 
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Table 1 
THE DECELERATION OF EMPWYMENT COSTS 
Annual Percent Change in the Labor Cost Index, 1980-1984 
Sector 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 
Total Private Non-Farm 9.00Jo 8.8% 6.3% 5.0% 4.1% 
· By Industry 
Manufacturing 9.4 8.7 5.6 4.3 4.4 
Durables 9.9 9.2 5.6 4.1 4.1 
Non-durables 8.6 7.7 5.8 5.6 4.9 
Non-manufacturing 8.8 9.0 6.5 5.5 4.0 
Construction 8.7 8.8 5.2 4.5 1.3 
Transportation and 
Public Utilities 11.2 8.4 7.2 7.3 3.3 
Retail Trade 7.0 7.5 4.1 4.7 5.1 
Wholesale Trade 10.0 7.8 6.2 4.8 5.5 
Finance, Insurance, 
and Real Estate 7.4 9.9 6.5 8.5 -.9 
Services 8.8 10.6 8.0 6.0 6.2 
By Occupation 
White Collar 8.7 9.1 6.4 5.9 4.4 
Blue Collar 9.5 8.6 5.6 5.0 3.6 
Service Workers 8.1 8.5 8.5 5.2 6.2 
Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
Increasing Productive Efficiency 
While management negotiations with unions are stabilizing labor costs 
import penetration has sparked a war on other costs. In addition to holdin~ 
down the cost of labor, firms are attempting to get more for the labor dollars 
they do spend by improving productivity. More flexible work rules and improved 
worker attitudes are two of the more important methods being used. 
Loosened work rules can generate important savings in the production 
process. The traditional way was to have narrow job classifications, with each 
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employee performing one task. With new agreements to perform a number of 
different tasks, however, fewer workers are required or the same number of 
workers can produce more. Also, there is less down time due to waiting for a 
worker with the right classification. This illustrates one among many 
efficiencies-large and small-which, in the aggregate, can result in substan-
tial increases in productivity and hence competitiveness. 
For example, a Chrysler plant in Indiana has reduced labor costs 30 percent 
or $2.8 million a year by getting workers to agree to perform tasks outside their 
crafts. Goodyear has signed a pact that allows the 429 craftsmen at its Alabama 
plant to work outside their trade as much as 25 percent of the time if necessary. 
General Motors successfully negotiated with its Manville, Ohio, union to 
eliminate jobs such as machinists' "tool chasers." Having machinists get their 
own tools and other changes raised productivity in one stamping plant by 26 
percent. 
Work-rule changes also have saved money in the petroleum industry, where 
refiners report that output per worker increased by more than 10 percent in 
recent years. One oil company, American Petrofina, merged six classifications 
into two at one refinery, cutting the workforce by 25 percent. The move saved 
$4 million a year. 
Table 2 
WAGE RATE CHANGES FOR MAJOR 
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS 
Percent of Workers by Category of Wage Change, 1980-1984 
First-Year 
Wage 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
Adjustment (first six months) 
Decrease OOJo 50Jo 2% 15% 5% 4% 
No change 0 3 42 22 18 22 
Increase 
0-4 percent 4 3 9 14 44 38 
4-8 percent 25 9 23 39 30 33 
8 percent and 
over 71 81 24 10 2 4 
Average Percent 
Change 9.5 9.8 3.8 2.6 2.4 2.8 
Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
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Some companies have attempted to improve worker attitudes on the 
reasonable assumption that more motivated workers do better quality work. 
At Jones & Laughlin, a major steel maker, a labor-management participation 
team analyzes production problems and suggests ways of improving efficiency. 
The company saved $7 5 million in 1982largely because of employee suggestions 
and workforce cutbacks that resulted in the remaining workers being assigned 
more duties. 
The Harley-Davidson Motor Company is also making great strides. Although 
the motorcycle maker has been protected by high tariffs, those tariff rates will 
decline automatically to 4 percent in 1988 from the 24 percent level levied in 1985. 
The prospect of dwindling protection has caused the company to adopt 
Japanese management techniques that are partially responsible for making it 
profitable again. 
Indeed, Harley-Davidson has attracted executives from other companies to 
its monthly seminars on efficient management. The firm has sharply decreased 
absenteeism by maintaining an open-door policy with workers and discussing 
employee complaints. Costs of fixing motorcycles on warranty have plummeted 
as a result of a new commitment to quality, the company says. This experience 
is not now unique in American industry. 
But tough negotiations with labor can cause backlashes. United Airlines 
pilots, angry because they believe the company tried to break the Air Line Pilots 
Association during a 29-day strike in 1985, are reportedly wasting fuel. A veteran 
United pilot told a reporter that an "awful lot of pilots are burning more gas. 
We're not interested in saving money for the company any more." 
Changes in Production Approaches 
Several American companies have adopted the Japanese just-in-time inven-
tory system in which components are provided as needed instead of having large 
batches made in advance and stored. Harley-Davidson, for example, reports that 
the system freed $22 million previously tied up in inventory at a York, Penn-
sylvania, plant alone and dramatically reduced reorder lead times. 
A Chrysler plant in Fenton, Missouri, also is using the just-in-time approach. 
The system cut its inventory to $20 million from $29 million, resulting in about 
$1 million a year savings in interest costs. Reduced inventory also has meant less 
damage to parts from overcrowded storage conditions. 
One of the most ambitious production improvement efforts to date is the 
General Motors Flint Assembly project, which is converting a 60-year-old com-
plex of unrelated component manufacturing and auto assembly plants into a 
500-acre integrated production facility. 
The Flint Assembly Complex builds, virtually under one roof, most of the 
major components needed for the front-wheel drive vehicles that replace the 
Buick LeSabre and the Olds Delta 88. The work performed includes engines, 
transmission components and complete bodies. In effect, steel blanks for body 
construction enter at one end of the plant and finished cars leave at the other. 
Previously, partially completed automobile bodies were built at a body plant 
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on the other side of town and shipped to the final assembly location. 
A key element at Flint is the just-in-time system of inventory management. 
The complex operates without the usual "safety net" in a conscious effort to 
force discipline into a manufacturing system that formerly operated with con-
venient, but expensive, fallback positions. If a quality problem now arises in 
any part of the system, it must be corrected immediately. Otherwise, the entire 
production operation may grind to a halt. 
Proponents of pursuing joint ventures with Japanese and South Korean 
companies defend it as a way of saving some American jobs; opponents 
view such out-sourcing as ~~xporting,, of jobs. 
As might be expected, considerable investment is required, especially in the 
company's workforce. Between 4,000 and 5,000 employees are receiving train-
ing in new technical skills in three Flint-area educational institutions. Building 
on the ongoing Quality of Work Life program, union officials participated in 
the planning of Flint Assembly throughout its development. 
Out-Sourcing. Each of the major auto producers is pursuing joint ventures 
with Japanese and South Korean companies as a long-term way of cutting costs 
on small cars. Proponents of this approach defend it as a way of saving some 
American jobs, while opponents view such out-sourcing as "exporting" of jobs. 
In any event, General Motors has at least four separate agreements with 
Japanese and South Korean affiliates to supply up to 500,000 cars a year to its 
U.S. dealers. Ford has contracts pending with Japan's Mazda Motor Corpora-
tion and Korea's Kia Industrial Company. Chrysler has signed ventures with 
Mitsubishi Motors and Samsung Corporation. 
The American steel industry is seeing the benefits in a similar arrangement. 
National Steel Corporation, which is half-owned by Nippon Kokan, has 
enhanced its productivity. In the first year of Japanese involvement, National 
increased the amount of prime finished product made from molten steel by 
3 percent. National Steel President Robert McBride estimates that a 1 percent 
increase in product yield adds $20 million to the company's profitability. 
Caterpillar Tractor Company, the world's largest manufacturer of heavy con-
struction equipment, also has learned this lesson. The company reached its goal 
of slashing costs by more than 20 percent by the end of 1985, a year ahead of 
schedule. It has reduced its workfo_rce by one-third and increased the number 
of parts it acquires from outside. Caterpillar's efforts seem to be paying off. The 
company reported a fourth-quarter 1985 pre-tax profit of $87 million, compared 
with a loss of $251 million for the same period in 1984. 
Targeting Capital Spending. Simultaneously, the composition of new capital 
spending by American industrial firms has shifted away in large measure from 
additions to productive capacity and toward replacement of existing machinery 
and facilities with more efficient equipment. For example, the outlays for new 
plant and equipment devoted to computers and instruments rose from $28 
9 
billion in 1970 to $142 billion in 1983. Such changes curb the unit cost of produc-
tion rather than expand the total amount of product. 
In some cases, the use of new technology can result in products manufactured 
more efficiently than at modern foreign plants. One ton of steel production at 
Chaparral Steel is estimated to use 1.8 man-hours, whereas the Japanese on 
average require 2.3 man-hours. Another steelmaker, Timken Company, invested 
$500 million in an advanced mill in the midst of the last recession. The new 
facility makes better quality steel for its tapered roller bearings, the anti-friction 
devices Timken invented. 
Other Strategies. Price reductions forcing cost containment have emerged as 
the dominant way that American firms respond to import pressures. But it is 
clear that they rely on other approaches simultaneously. In addition, there are 
many variations on the price or economizing approach to meeting foreign 
competition. 
For example, in the auto manufacturing industry for many years operations 
had been based on achieving economies of scale via high-volume, long-running 
production with fairly rigid product specifications. Because economies of scale 
emphasized large factories and standard product design, changes in the product 
could become expensive. Today, as a result of a shift to computer-based 
manufacturing, production can be based on economies of scope. This newer 
approach allows for low-cost, flexible production of a variety of products on 
the same automated equipment. 
An extension of this economizing strategy is leading to important structural 
changes in a great many of the larger American corporations. The horizontally 
integrated firm, producing virtually every product in the markets in which it 
operates, is becoming less prevalent. Many companies are preferring to 
specialize, focusing on specific product niches that are secure against foreign 
competition. 
On reflection, this is to be expected as U.S. firms find themselves competing 
more fully in a global economy. Surely far fewer of our domestic markets can 
be properly thought of as part of a closed economy. 
In an ambitious restructuring effort, General Electric raised about $5 billion 
since 1981 by selling off 155 divisions. Among them were GE's small-appliance 
operation, which manufactures toasters and irons, and Utah International, a 
natural-resource subsidiary. 
The company's new strategy is to move gradually away from traditional 
manufacturing and to focus instead on growth industries such as electronics and 
financial services. The $5 billion proceeds from its restructuring activities helped 
to finance its acquisition of RCA, a move strengthening GE's position in 
electronics and services. 
The Union Carbide Corporation, a firm under severe pressure for many 
reasons in addition to foreign competition, also has undergone extensive restruc-
turing. It has divested $500 million in what it now views as "non-strategic" assets 
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and businesses, including its commodity-metals business and its European bulk-
chemical, plastics and polyethylene businesses. Carbide also wrote down other 
assets totalling $865 million, including petrochemicals, metals and carbons 
segments. At the same time, the company built an industrial gases plant in Spain, 
acquired a consumer products business in France and entered an industrial gases 
joint venture in Italy. 
Companies also are combatting imports with financing innovations. Major 
U.S. car manufacturers have increased sales by providing low-interest-rate 
financing on new cars. In effect, this means squeezing profit margins in an effort 
to remain competitive. 
In addition, a rapid rate of product innovation has been emphasized. 
American shoe firms such as Timberland Company, Reebok International and 
Rockport Company have responded with stylish footwear to ward off foreign 
competition. Even apparel manufacturing, one of the most import-affected 
industries, is using style to compete with low-cost foreign products. Companies 
such as RJMJ Inc. continue to make a profit selling women's pants and shorts 
through improved timing and greater flexibility of production. Whereas foreign 
apparel makers need at least six months' lead time to coordinate manufacturing 
with retail sales, RJMJ's president says his company "can turn on a dime. We 
can get piece goods to [our plants] in a day or two and produce products for 
the shelves in three to four weeks. That enables us to catch a trend." 
The Influence of Government 
Meanwhile, government actions to reduce the value of the dollar in world cur-
rency markets are helping American firms to compete more effectively both at 
home and abroad. Despite some softening in the dollar in 1985, the average value 
of the dollar in relation to other major currencies (the "trade-weighted" dollar) 
remains almost 40 percent higher than the level in 1980. This is the equivalent 
of a special 40 percent tax levied on American producers, exacerbating other 
cost differences with their foreign competitors. 
A significant weakening of the dollar would enhance the 
effectiveness of the various private-sector strategies to 
restore the competitiveness of American firms. 
There are many reasons for the strong dollar. Some of these are inherently 
favorable, such as the worldwide view that the American economy is a major 
"safe haven" for investors. There is little concern here about expropriation or 
the other arbitrary governmental actions that have occurred so frequently 
overseas and have increased the relative risk of investing in many other countries. 
But some of the reasons for the strong dollar are not so benign, such as the 
massive budget deficits whose financing has forced real interest rates up so high. 
That, in turn, has increased the foreign demand for dollars and in the process 
raised the "price" (or exchange rate) of dollars. 
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Recent governmental policies and actions have attempted to restore the U.S. 
dollar to its earlier exchange rate relationships. The passage of the Gramm-
Rudman-Hollings bill represents a congressional and presidential commitment 
to eliminate the federal budget deficit by 1991. The specific budget cuts needed 
to achieve that goal, however, have not yet been designated by the Congress or 
the White House. 
Simultaneously, Secretary of the Treasury James Baker has embarked on an 
international cooperative effort to encourage the downward movement of the 
dollar in foreign exchange markets. A significant weakening of the dollar would 
enhance the effectiveness of the various private-sector strategies to restore the 
competitiveness of American firms and of the goods and services that they pro-
duce and sell. But lasting changes in exchange rates require more substantive 
actions than merely financial intervention by governments in international cur-
rency markets. Sustained improvements in monetary and fiscal policies are 
required. 
Improving the Quality of U.S. Products 
An important lesson that American companies have learned in recent years 
is that "Made in Japan" (or South Korea or Taiwan) is no longer synonomous 
with shoddy quality. In fact, the inroads of foreign competition into U.S. 
domestic markets have frequently been caused by the superior quality of the 
import rather than just lower cost. As a result, unprecedented pressure has been 
generated for improving the quality of products that American businesses 
manufacture. 
A 1985 poll on product quality showed mixed results. In many product 
categories, American-made items were rated as being of higher quality than the 
corresponding import (see Table 3). Important examples of perceived U.S. 
superiority in quality included furniture, clothing, personal computers, appli-
ances and-by a smaller margin-automobiles. However, the survey also 
showed that 45 percent of the respondents viewed imported consumer elec-
tronics goods (televisions, radios and VCRs) as being of higher quality, while 
only 40 percent thought the same goods made in the United States were of higher 
quality. Many recent actions by U.S. companies to deal with the quality challenge 
demonstrate the feedback effects of our non-linear economy. 
Meeting Domestic Quality Requirements 
Many U.S. firms are responding positively to the consumer preference for 
quality. For example, Steinway & Sons, the well-known piano manufacturer, fac-
ing rising competition from Yamaha and Kawai, has improved the quality of 
its pianos, which remain popular with concert pianists. The company proudly 
recalls that 35 of the 37 Asian contestants performed on Steinway grands at a 
recent international competition. 
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Despite increased imports, Steinway & Sons is forecasting increased sales. 
Steinway President Lloyd Meyer contends that American manufacturers 
generally have rested too long on their laurels and allowed importers to equal 
them in quality. "I blame management for losing the quality edge:' Steinway 
Company's president maintains. 
Indeed, ignoring or de-emphasizing quality can be costly, as a Harvard 
Business School study of the air conditioning industry demonstrated. Professor 
David Garvin found that the failure rates of room air conditioners from the 
lowest-quality producers were between 500 and 1,000 times greater than those 
from the highest-quality producers. 
Garvin analyzed Japanese and American firms in an industry where prac-
tically the same assembly-line processes and manufacturing equipment are used 
Table 3 
U.S. CONSUMERS' VIEWS ON PRODUCT QUALITY 
July-August 1985 Survey 
Item 
Furniture 
Major appliances 
Clothing 
Small appliances 
Automobiles 
Personal computers 
TVs, radios, VCRs, etc. 
Weighted Average 
Percent Viewing 
U.S. Goods as 
Higher Quality 
840Jo 
78 
70 
58 
46 
41 
40 
53% 
Source: American Society for Quality Control. 
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Percent Viewing 
Foreign Goods as 
Higher Quality 
4% 
6 
13 
19 
38 
22 
45 
14% 
to make an essentially standardized product. Therefore, the staggering differ-
ences in performance between Japanese and American firms could not be attri-
buted to differences in technology or capital. 
Japanese comp(.lnies were reported to be far superior to their U.S. counter-
parts in many measurable ways. The average U.S. assembly-line defect rate was 
almost 70 times that of the Japanese and their average first -year service call rate 
nearly 17 times the Japanese service call rate. Products made by the worst 
Japanese company had an average failure rate less than half that of the best U.S. 
manufacturer. 
The key payoff of higher quality comes from the savings realized from 
avoiding the costs of reworking defective products or replacing defective parts. 
Garvin noted that "failures are much more expensive to fix after a unit has been 
assembled than before." In addition, customer complaints about products-
even when they are subsequently replaced-often result in the long-term ero-
sion of a company's customer base. 
Westinghouse Electric is an example of a corporation that can show benefits 
from emphasizing quality. It has established 2,000 quality circles involving 
20,000 employees and a Quality College to foster participative management and 
quality training. The result has been that Westinghouse has averaged real 
productivity gains of 7 percent a year for three years in a row, 1982 through 1984. 
Thomas Murrin, president of Westinghouse's energy and advanced technology 
group, says such a result "means that every 10 years you double your output 
without adding any resources." 
Emphasizing quality has also profited Harley-Davidson. Management places 
more responsibility on the individual worker, coaching employees to evaluate 
their own work and improve the quality of the components. All employees 
receive 40 hours of training in statistics so they better understand how to measure 
the quality of their output and improvements in it. The moves have caused a 
rise in defect-free motorcycles coming off the assembly line. Whereas 50 per-
cent of the motorcycles were free of defects five years ago, 99 percent are now 
reported to be flawless. 
High-technology industry also is concentrating on quality. In 1980, Hewlett-
Packard tested semiconductors from three American companies and three 
Japanese firms, and found that the Japanese failure rate was one-sixth that of 
the U.S. producers. But the American firms virtually had closed the gap when 
the same test was made two years later. 
America's automakers, long regarded as the epitome of old-line industry, are 
also making substantial strides. On a crash program to close the "quality gap" 
with their foreign counterparts, particularly the Japanese, domestic automobile 
manufacturers have been pressuring American steel manufacturers to improve 
their performance. Three years ago, for example, Ford was rejecting and return-
ing nearly 9 percent of the steel it purchased from suppliers because of surface 
defects or faulty chemistry. Now the rate has been reduced to less than 2 percent. 
One way of improving quality is to iron out the bugs in the assembly process 
before shipping the product. OM took this step in its new Wentzville, Missouri, 
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facility. The announcement was unusual apparently because the company' s-
and the industry's-previous practice was to iron out these problems while con-
tinuing production. Quality problems in the past were thus passed on to the 
dealers and customers to avoid the huge costs of halting production. 
A somewhat similar experience occurred in the fall of 1985 in Ford's 
automotive operations in Dearborn, Michigan. Production was delayed because 
the rear doors were not meeting the rear fenders correctly. Ford executive Lou 
Ross was quoted as saying, "Ten years ago, confronted with the same problem, 
we would have built on the appointed day. Today ... we start when we meet the 
standard." 
The scene was repeated at a Detroit-area GM plant, where faulty Cadillacs 
and Chevrolet Caprices remained in the repair lots instead of being shipped to 
the dealers. "What really blows the minds of people today is that we won't ship 
cars if we don't have the quality right," says GM spokesman Clifford Merriott. 
Unintentionally repeating Ford's estimate, he adds, "There's no doubt that 10 
years ago we would have shipped those cars." 
"Ha! Ten years ago?" says M.L. Douglas, president of the United Auto 
Workers' Local 22. "It's more like two years ago ... But people are beginning 
to realize that we just can't do things like that anymore." In retrospect, how could 
the average worker on the production floor have been expected to really care 
about quality when management appeared to be so indifferent? 
Pushing faulty cars out the factory door also can be expensive. Chrysler 
learned that lesson when it tried to meet a deadline on the Plymouth Volare/ 
Dodge Aspen models in the mid-1970s. "Not doing any galvanizing on the 
Aspen/Volare cost us $100 million because of rust," Chrysler Chairman Lee 
Iacocca says. The rest of the industry seems to have learned the lesson. Ford now 
allows 36 months from car design to production instead of the former 28 
months. 
Auto companies also have improved quality through quick response to defects 
in parts. Chrysler's Fenton, Missouri, plant now corrects problems with parts 
in two days. A decade ago, the turnaround time could have been as much 
as 20 days. 
Catering to Foreign Customers 
Quality is not only important to American consumers, but especially to 
foreign consumers, notably the Japanese. Ocean Foods of Astoria, Inc. in 
Oregon has capitalized on the Japanese consumers' characteristic concern for 
higher-quality products, making Japan one of its principal markets. "They'll 
pay top dollar for your product, but only if it's of absolute top quality," says 
Grant Larson, vice president of Ocean Foods. "They are unmovable when it 
comes to quality control." 
Ocean Foods pays special attention to detail in its food processing to ensure 
mandatory quality control for the finicky Japanese. In the words of one senior 
executive of the firm: 
When we catch the fish, they are eviscerated and stacked a precise way. Then 
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the fish are flash-frozen. If the salmon aren't arranged this way prior to freez-
ing, some of them will freeze at uneven temperatures. The flesh can become 
slightly discolored, or part of a tail will stick to the salmon below or above 
it and break off. If there is the slightest discoloration of the fish, or if part 
of the tail is broken off, forget it. You just won't sell that salmon [to the 
Japanese]. 
Other U.S. companies are apparently realizing the appreciation that the 
Japanese have for quality-the average consumer in Japan spends about $600 
a year on American-made goods (the average U.S. consumer spends only $290 
a year on Japanese products). Although few people in Japan had heard of Cross 
pens a decade or so ago, they have become a status symbol and are considered 
a most desirable business gift. Comparable results have occurred for other 
overseas competitors in Japan. Bondhus Corporation hand tools command 80 
percent of the Japanese market even though five Japanese firms have lower 
prices. 
Commitments to Quality 
The enhanced concern with improving quality in American industry has not 
been primarily a matter of setting up new quality control departments or even 
expanding existing ones. After all, companies in the United States traditionally 
devoted far more resources to quality-control efforts than did their foreign 
counterparts. 
But quality assurance is more than just a collection of expensive scientific 
and professional personnel checking, reviewing and improving production prac-
tices. Producing quality requires emphasizing this aspect of the production 
process throughout the firm. 
The air-conditioner-industry study cited earlier confirms this point. Japanese 
companies pay more attention to quality than many of their American com-
petitors by means of such innovations as creating internal consumer review 
boards to evaluate the products. Another way the Japanese foster quality is by 
having top management hold daily review meetings about quality. In contrast, 
American firms with the lowest assembly defect rates met 10 times a month; 
the worst-quality U.S. companies averaged four such meetings a month. 
Management's message was reflected on the front lines of production. First-
line supervisors at four of six Japanese air conditioner manufacturers surveyed 
said quality was most important to management; their counterparts at nine of 
11 U.S. companies surveyed said meeting the production schedule was the highest 
priority. 
Management can communicate its emphasis on quality by paying attention 
even to small details. For instance, National Steel now requires workers to clean 
their work stations instead of leaving the task for janitors. The Japanese 
co-owners, who suggested the policy, reasoned that if workers have enough pride 
to take care of their work stations, they might also care more for their product. 
But there is more to improving quality than just providing an example. For 
instance, Chaparral Steel Company uses an unusual but no longer novel 
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approach to employee relations to ensure that workers put into practice what 
the company preaches: It practices egalitarianism in many aspects of its activities 
in an effort to improve output and quality. "We consider everyone to be line, 
there are no staff positions per se," says Chaparral President Gordon Forward. 
The company has no customer service representatives, for example. Production 
managers answer customer complaints. Forward says, "You ought to see how 
motivated they are to fix the problem when they come back." 
The most effective quality controls involve a shift in the 
locus of responsibility-from inspectors to the 
employees who actually do the work. 
Thus, the most effective quality controls involve, in effect, a shift in the locus 
of responsibility-from the inspectors in the quality control department to the 
employees who actually do the work. Pushed by foreign competition and the 
non-linear nature of America's free-market economy, many U.S. companies are 
discovering this way to achieve higher-quality production. 
The Accelerating Growth of Research and Development 
Even though many government officials occasionally wax eloquent about the 
science policy of the federal government, the United States lacks a comprehen-
sive policy on the subject. Others can debate whether that is good or bad. What 
is relevant to this analysis is that the great bulk of research and development 
financed and sponsored by the federal government is not a result of deliberate 
actions to carry out a policy on "science." Rather, in most instances, it is more 
a matter of happenstance. Yet a shift in science funding has powerful effects 
on the competitiveness of American industry. 
Thus, in the haphazard nature of science policy, the completion of the "man 
on the moon" project by NASA meant a reduction in that agency's budget. It 
just so happens that NASA devotes one of the highest percentages of expen-
ditures to R & D among federal agencies. As shown in Table 4, NASA spent 
one-half of its budget on R & Din 1981, while the ratio for the federal govern-
ment as a whole was less than 5 percent. Thus, a shift in emphasis in the federal 
budget away from space exploration was simultaneously a move to downgrade 
the importance of science in the federal government. 
Similarly, and of greater consequence because of its overwhelming size, the 
post-Vietnam cutbacks in the military budget meant a major decline in the 
volume of federal R & D funding-but not as a deliberate policy. The shift in 
emphasis in the federal budget during the 1970s from, so to speak, warfare to 
welfare meant a shift of resources away from the most R & D-intensive sectors 
of the budget. Simultaneously, a rapid expansion occurred in federal spending 
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Table 4 
FEDERAL AGENCY R & D AND TOTAL OUTLAYS IN 1984 
R&D Total R&D/ 
Department or Agency Outlays Outlays Total 
(in billions) (percent) 
Above-average R & D Ratios 
National Science Foundation $ 1.1 $ 1.2 91.7% 
NASA 3.5 7.0 50.0 
Energy Department 4.7 10.6 44.3 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission .2 .5 40.0 
Commerce Department 
.3 1.9 15.8 
Defense Department 23.6 220.8 10.7 
Foreign aid (non-military) 
.1 1.1 9.1 
Interior Department 
.4 4.9 8.2 
Environmental Protection Agency .3 4.1 7.3 
Total, Federal Government 40.5 851.8 4.8 
Below-average R & D Ratios 
Agriculture Department 
.9 37.5 2.4 
Health and Human Services 
Department 4.5 292.3 1.5 
Transportation Department 
.3 23.9 1.3 
Veterans Administration .2 25.6 0.8 
All other 
.4 220.4 0.2 
Source: Compiled from data prepared by U.S. Office of Management and 
Budget. 
programs that involve the least amount of outlays for science and technology, 
notably the Department of Health and Human Services (in the form of transfer 
payments) and the Department of Agriculture (primarily price-support 
subsidies). 
The Recent Rise in Federal Funding 
However, the massive buildup in U.S. defense spending begun in 1981 has 
ended the slowdown of federal R & D outlays that occurred in the 1970s. Now 
the largest dollar increases in federal expenditures are budgeted for the Pentagon, 
a part of the government that spends more than twice the proportion of its 
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budget on R & D than the typical civilian agency. To be sure, there is considerable 
controversy about the extent to which R & D spending by the military establish-
ment benefits the civilian economy. Certainly not all military R & D has com-
mercial applications. In fact, America has considerable negative experience with 
past attempts to apply defense technology directly to civilian uses. 
A recent analysis of approximately 1,000 large U.S. manufacturing firms con-
cluded that company-financed spending on R & Dis more productive than 
federally-financed research. Presumably, the firm spends money on R & D to 
raise its productivity and profits, while government-financed R & Dis under-
taken primarily to fulfill specific research contracts for which the firm is 
remunerated directly. 
It does seem, however, that subcontractors and supplying firms in the elec-
tronics and instruments industries, for example, have enjoyed considerable 
success in commercializing their defense-financed technology. In contrast, the 
large aerospace firms have demonstrated only limited ability to diversify out-
side of aviation. 
All in all, when the Department of Defense devotes an additional $100 billion 
to applications of science and engineering in a half decade, there is a great 
possibility that a larger stream of product and process innovation will occur in 
the years ahead. That possibility is reinforced by the Pentagon's current tendency 
to support technological advancement in areas having civilian applications such 
as computers. 
For example, the Department of Defense recently awarded Carnegie-Mellon 
University a $103 million contract to develop and operate a Software Engineer-
ing Institute. The bulk of the Institute's work will be original, unclassified 
research, including development of better education processes for teaching soft-
ware. Although its main customers will be defense contractors, a second tier will 
include companies that build such commercial items as telecommunications and 
air traffic control systems. 
Moreover,- some analysts contend that the Pentagon's Strategic Defense 
Initiative (popularly known as "Star Wars") will yield commercial applications 
in such areas as supercomputers, software, sophisticated sensors and space 
technology. 
High-yield supercomputers are useful in a wide range of scientific and indus-
trial applications, including telecommunications, weather forecasting, medical 
research and aircraft design. The need to automate SDI systems is also expected 
to advance commercial applications in the emerging field of artificial intelli-
gence. Likewise, in order to meet the tracking requirements of SDI, 
developments will take place in optical design and manufacturing that can have 
important civilian uses. 
There is no need to jump to the conclusion that the most effective way of 
promoting scientific progress in the United States is to encourage a military 
buildup. Surely, the direct expenditure of these funds on civilian-oriented 
R & D, especially of a commercial orientation, would be expected to be far more 
productive. But the fact remains that the only time when Congress will appro-
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priate tens of billions of dollars on R & D in a half decade is when it elevates 
national defense and such other R & D-intensive functions of government as 
space exploration and energy development to the top of the priority list. In 1984, 
for example, the Department of Defense spent $23.6 billion for R & D, the 
Department of Energy $4.7 billion and NASA $3.5 billion. 
The only time when Congress will appropriate tens of billions of dollars on 
R & D in a half decade is when it elevates national defense, space 
exploration and energy development to the top of the priority list. 
In striking contrast, when Congress decides to be generous to science and 
technology per se, it expands the budgets of the major science agencies by only 
tens of millions or, at best, by several hundred million dollars. In 1984, the total 
budget of the National Science Foundation came to $1.2 billion. That year the 
Department of Commerce spent about $300 million on the Bureau of Stand-
ards and all of its other scientific activities. The Department of the Interior 
devoted approximately $400 million to the Coast and Geodetic Survey and other 
R & D bureaus. 
Also, federal funding for R & D tends to fall when income transfer programs 
are elevated to higher priority in the budget. In the case of the Department of 
Health and Human Services, R & D expenditures in 1984 comprised 1.5 per-
cent of its budget (mainly for the National Institutes of Health). 
The Results of R & D 
Of course, it is far easier to measure inputs than outputs in the areas of science 
and technology. That is, we can more readily quantify the resources going into 
the performance of research and development than the new or improved 
products or processes that result. 
Nevertheless, several economists have attempted to estimate the overall rate 
of return from research and development performed in the United States in 
recent years. As shown in Table 5, the estimates of R & D payoffs range widely. 
The lower figures usually are limited to benefits to the company performing the 
R & D, while the higher estimates include uses by the customers of the company 
and other firms. Surely, we would expect individual analysts to differ in their 
calculations. What is reassuring is that virtually all of the measured returns to 
R & D are impressively high. 
In addition, the tax reforms of 1981 included a new tax credit for incremen-
tal R & D, an incentive in addition to direct federal spending in this area. 
Preliminary evaluations show limited effects in terms of added private-sector 
R & D undertakings. However, the temporary nature of the tax credit is cited 
as an important limitation; the credit is scheduled to expire as of December 31, 
1985. In its current consideration of tax reform legislation, the House of 
Representatives voted last December to extend the life of the tax credit, but not 
to make it a permanent feature of the Internal Revenue Code. 
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Researcher 
Scherer 
Terleckyj 
Fellner 
Nadiri 
Griliches 
Table 5 
ESTIMATED RETURNS TOR & D 
Rate of 
Return 
70-1040Jo 
29-78 
31-55 
20 
17 
Area 
Covered 
Macroeconomy 
Macroeconomy 
Macroeconomy 
Manufacturing 
Manufacturing 
Years 
Covered 
1973-78 
1946-66 
1953-66 
1958-75 
1957-65 
Note: Variations within and between studies often depend on the scope of the 
report (e.g. whether they include benefits to customers of the 
company doing the R & D). 
Source: See bibliography. 
In any event, data published by the National Science Foundation show a rapid 
upturn in growth rates of both federal and private expenditures on R & D in 
recent years and thus an acceleration in total R & D spending in the United States 
(see Table 6). During the four-year period from 1980 to 1984, federal spending 
on R & Din real terms (adjusted for inflation) rose 12.2 percent a year. This was 
a significantly more rapid growth rate than the 9.4 percent average for the 
preceding four years. During the same periods, private-sector-financed R & D 
spending rose at a greater rate-14.2 percent a year since 1980 and 13.9 percent 
annually in the prior four years. 
Some of the specific instances of recent state and local investments in R & 
Dare noteworthy. Since 1983, Michigan has invested more than $50 million in 
small, new companies. Three other states-Ohio, Illinois and Indiana- have 
spent more than $250 million on programs for new, high-technology entre-
preneurs. In addition, the 13 states of the Midwest Governors Conference each 
have contributed $250,000 to open the Midwest Technology Development 
Institute in Minneapolis. 
There are already some promising indicators of the effects of the stepped up 
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Year 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
Table 6 
REAL OUTLAYS FOR R & D, 1975-1984 
(dollars in billions) 
Federal 
Government 
$16.6 
18.9 
20.5 
22.3 
24.7 
27.2 
30.8 
34.5 
38.2 
42.9 
Percent 
Change 
13.90Jo 
8.5 
8.8 
10.8 
10.1 
13.2 
12.0 
10.7 
12.3 
Private 
Industry 
$14.5 
16.8 
18.6 
20.9 
24.0 
28.2 
32.8 
37.7 
42.7 
47.9 
Percent Total 1 
Change 
$32.2 
15.9% 37.1 
10.7 40.5 
12.4 44.9 
14.8 50.6 
17.5 57.4 
16.3 65.8 
14.9 74.5 
13.3 83.3 
12.2 93.4 
1 Includes universities and other non-profit institutions. 
Percent 
Change 
15.2% 
9.2 
10.9 
12.7 
13.4 
14.6 
13.2 
11.8 
12.1 
Note: Actual data have been deflated by GNP price deflator, 1972 = 100. 
Source: U.S. National Science Foundation. 
investments in R & D. According to the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, more 
than 15,000 companies make high-technology equipment in the eight states 
bordering on the Great Lakes. At least 100 new companies specializing in 
biomedicine and computer software have located within 50 miles of the Mayo 
Clinic in Rochester, Minnesota. Based on historical experience, we can expect 
that recent investments in research and development will create some new 
product lines and perhaps even new industries with high growth potential. 
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This process of "creative destruction" described by Schum peter implies that 
some industries will likely decline while others take their place. As pointed out 
by Sven Arndt of the American Enterprise Institute, domestic products that 
incorporate substantial amounts of research and development become com-
petitive while more mature items are increasingly replaced by imports. 
Thus, products with well-established design and production technology often 
can be manufactured more economically abroad by producers who acquire 
blueprints, technological know-how and even factories in world markets. Their 
quality control is frequently superior, and a large part of the production costs 
is relatively cheap factory labor. High-priced workers in the United States using 
technologies that are available to their lower-cost competitors find it increas-
ingly difficult to compete. 
Investments in research and development constitute an important 
way in which American industry can hold its own 
in the face of virulent foreign competition. 
Hence, investments in research and development constitute an important way 
in which American industry can hold its own in the face of virulent foreign com-
petition. Improving process technology or offering new and superior products 
is a far more positive-and essentially more effective-approach than s~eking 
government protection. 
In many industries, designing and marketing new and better goods makes the 
future bright for an advanced economy such as the United States. That is, this 
country frequently maintains its comparative advantage in R & D-intensive 
industries. Table 7lists 14 examples of successful penetration by U.S. companies 
in Japanese markets. In most cases, product development and technological 
skills are listed by the Japanese as the keys to the sales penetration by American 
firms. Thus, increased application of the fruits of science and technology to 
American industry is an important reason for expecting that today's gloom-and-
doom expectations will turn into tomorrow's non-linear economic recovery. 
The Outlook for the 1990s 
Highlights of the Report 
Let us now sum up the key points we have made. Throughout America's 
economic history, feedback effects have helped to end both upswings and 
downturns. The United States is experiencing such a change during the current 
period of economic slowdown. The feedback effects are arising from such 
diverse factors as the deep recession of 1981-82, intense international competi-
tion and rapidly expanding defense spending. 
The resulting new and positive forces are: 
(1) Managerial and governmental actions that reduce the cost of producing 
goods and services in the United States. 
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Table 7 
SOME U.S. SUCCESS STORIES IN JAPAN 
Share of Keys to 
Company Product Japanese Success (as seen 
Market by Japanese) 
Consumer Goods (ImQorted} 
Eastman Kodak film 20o/o brand name; lack of 
early competition 
Procter & Gamble disposable 50 new product; acqui-
diapers sition of Japanese 
company's sales 
network 
Warner-Lambert razors 70 new product; use of 
Japanese company's 
sales network 
Consumer Goods (Local Production} 
Coca-Cola soft drinks 60 active advertising; 
distinctive produc-
tion and sales set-
up (franchises) 
Corning Glass heat-resistant 30 new product 
glassware 
Kimberly-Clark tissue paper 20 use of business part-
ner's distribution 
network; tech-
nological and 
product-develop-
ment skills 
Johnson & Johnson bandages 31 new product; active 
advertising 
S. C. Johnson & Son floor wax 30 technological and 
product-develop-
ment skills 
Capital Goods (Imported) 
Boeing jet airplanes 60 careful market 
research; strong 
after-sales service 
IBM computers 40 technological skills 
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Table 7 (cont.) 
SOME U.S. SUCCESS STORIES IN JAPAN 
Company Product 
CaQital Goods (Local Production} 
Caterpillar 
Martin Marietta 
Dow Corning 
Xerox 
bulldozers 
concrete mixing 
agents 
silicon resins 
copiers 
Share of 
Japanese 
Market 
43% 
50 
20 
20 
Keys to 
Success (as seen 
by Japanese) 
technological and 
product-develop-
ment skills; strong 
after-sales services 
new products 
use of Japanese 
partner's distribu-
tion network; 
technological and 
product develop-
ment skills 
technological and 
product-develop-
ment skills; distinc-
tive sales system 
(rentals) 
Source: Trading With Japan (Tokyo: Keizai Kobo Center, 1985). 
(2) Enhanced personal responsibility for the quality of what Americans 
produce. 
(3) More rapid domestic growth in research and development, the basic fuel 
for innovation and technical progress. 
The often-painful changes provoked by greater competition, at home and 
abroad, range from out-sourcing to reducing labor costs to fundamental cor-
porate restructuring. Simultaneously, many U.S. firms are discovering that 
product quality rests primarily with the workers on the front lines of produc-
tion rather than in quality control departments. At the same time, the expan-
sion of military spending has resulted in an upturn in federal research and 
development that has powerful spillover effects in the civilian economy. 
None of these three factors yields quick or dramatic changes. Yet the 
cumulative and interactive effects that they generate are likely to endure and to 
reinforce each other. Virtually all of the changes work in the same direction-
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Source: Federal Reserve System 
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toward generating new and better products that will result in more orders, pro-
duction, employment, income and profits for American investors, managers 
and workers. These changes surely will not prevent the possibility of another 
recession during the second half of the 1980s. But they do make for a brighter 
outlook for the period beyond, that is, for the decade of the 1990s. 
Thus, there is a reasonable basis for expecting that the ability of American 
firms to compete in world markets in the years ahead will be substantially 
improved. Likewise, the relative attractiveness of domestically produced 
products to American consumers should increase significantly. In the process, 
the real standard of living of the American people should rise noticeably. 
In any event, we need to realize that the industrial sector of the American 
economy is far from being in the sad shape that many fear. In a journalistic ver-
sion of Gresham's Law, it sometimes seems that bad news drives out good. It 
surely is not widely known that industrial production in the United States hit 
a new high in 1984 when the Federal Reserve's Index reached 122 (1977 = 100). 
During 1985, the Index of Industrial Production reached a plateau averaging 
124 (see Figure 3). In fact, manufacturing's share of the real gross domestic pro-
duction has held steady for the last 30 years-at about 25 percent (see Figure 
4). Economic naysayers do not have a factual basis for their unalloyed 
pessimism. Manufacturing in the United States is not going "down the tube," 
nor are we becoming a nation whose major employers are hamburger stands 
and clothing stores. 
Foreign Counteractions 
On the other hand, the positive developments stressed in this report are not 
foregone conclusions. For one thing, foreign competitors can improve on their 
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current strategies while U.S. companies try to catch up. 
Signs of such a development are showing in the automobile industry. While 
a Wall Street Journal/NBC News poll in November 1985 reported that the 
percentage of Americans choosing to buy foreign-made cars had declined from 
25 percent to 21 percent, it also found that one-third of college-educated 
Americans and 30 percent of Americans under 35 years of age said they would 
purchase a foreign car. Auto makers emphasize the importance of those groups: 
College-educated Americans tend to buy the most expensive cars and acquire 
them more frequently. And auto companies have also learned the hard way that 
if a young American's first car is foreign-made, it is harder to convince him or 
her to "buy American" in the future. 
There is no certainty that America's Big Three car makers will succeed in clos-
ing the gap. Simultaneous with the improvements in U.S. automaking, Japanese 
motor vehicle manufacturers are becoming very different and more dangerous 
competitors. They are doing so by differentiating their products according to 
function, price and appearance as well as size, attacking the American Big Three 
from many directions at once. The Japanese have increased the 21 nameplates 
and 46 separate models made in 1980 to 34 nameplates and 74 separate models 
last year. "It won't be enough to have both fuel-efficient and high-quality cars," 
says Gerald Hirshberg, director of design at Nissan in California. "What's left 
is sheer creativity and agility that will dictate success and failure of new entries." 
Figure 4 
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Nor are the Japanese the only competitors with whom American companies 
must deal. The South Koreans are pinning their hopes of opening U.S. maFkets 
to Korean brand products on the Excel, a subcompact car introduced in 1985. 
If the Excel is successful, it will add to the quieter successes of Korean-made 
products such as the Leading EdgeD personal computer, which was the fastest-
selling product in its industry during the last Christmas shopping season. In 
fact, Korean companies also have entered many U.S. consumer-goods markets 
such as color televisions as manufacturers for American brand distributors. ''As 
the Japanese keep moving 'upmarket,'" says David Cole, Far East specialist at 
the Harvard Institute for International Development, "the Koreans can move 
in and take over." 
Other countries also are improving their competitive positions and the chang-
ing relationships at times may be indicative of future trends. For example, Korean 
construction companies-who have increasingly been giving their American 
counterparts tough competition in bidding on overseas projects-are now com-
plaining about the low-cost rivalry from Turkish and Indian firms. 
Public Policies May Alter the Economic Course 
Another factor that may hurt the chances of an improved economy in the 
1990s is further public policy changes that may not all be benign. Pressures to 
reduce the budget deficit, for example, may result in raising the tax burden on 
saving and investment, reducing these basic factors for economic growth. 
Indeed, the tax reform bill that the House of Representatives passed in December 
1985 eliminates the investment tax credit, reduces the R & D credit, and tightens 
up on depreciation allowances. 
Also, should protectionist pressures succeed in leading to the erection of addi-
tional trade barriers, much of the resultant burden would be born in the form 
of higher costs imposed on the industries using higher-priced protected inputs. 
U.S. export industries would be especially hard hit-and would be vulnerable 
to retaliation. 
In addition, a new round of burdensome domestic government regulation 
would both raise the cost of compliance and deter companies from investment 
and innovation. Moreover, another shift in federal budget priorities-from 
defense to transfer payments-could dampen the upward trend of R & D spend-
ing. Yet the three key forces for enhanced competitiveness identified here appear 
to have considerable momentum, and the prospects for their durability are quite 
bright. 
Our upbeat conclusion is more than merely taking an optimistic position for 
the future. It relies on the powerful importance of feedback effects. The 1990s 
look good because downward trends tend, after awhile, to be reversed in the non-
linear American economy. But that phenomenon also alerts us to another, 
related fact that likely will be more germaine for the decade that follows: Upward 
trends breed a complacency that erodes the progress made during the doldrums. 
That underscores a far more basic point-in change there is both opportunity 
and challenge. 
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